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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
CALDWELL, District Judge. 
 
Lorenzo Dorsey appeals from the district court's refusal 
at sentencing to follow commentary to U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(b) 
in application note 2 to the guideline. Under that note, the 
court could have reduced Dorsey's federal sentence by a 
certain amount of time he had spent in state custody, 
thereby essentially giving him credit for that period of 
imprisonment before the federal sentence was imposed. 
Dorsey also asserts that the district court's action violates 
the double jeopardy clause because by refusing him credit 
the United States would be punishing him twice for the 
same offense. 
 
Because the district court erred in deciding that only the 
Bureau of Prisons has the authority to grant sentencing 
credits, we will reverse and remand for resentencing, and 
direct that the court comply with the procedure set forth in 
the application note. Our resolution of this guidelines issue 
renders consideration of the double jeopardy claim 
unnecessary. 
 
I. 
 
On May 7, 1996, the appellant was arrested in Newark, 
New Jersey, and charged with illegal possession of a 
firearm. He was sent to a New Jersey state prison the next 
day for a parole violation arising from this firearms offense. 
Both the United States and New Jersey decided to 
prosecute him for the offense. On August 21, 1996, he was 
indicted in federal court under 18 U.S.C. S 924(g)(1). On 
September 18, 1996, he was indicted in a New Jersey 
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court. On October 8, 1996, the appellant was released into 
the community from the sentence he was serving in state 
prison for the parole violation. On April 11, 1997, he was 
arrested by state authorities and incarcerated in a New 
Jersey state prison. Federal authorities lodged a detainer 
against him. 
 
Appellant pled guilty to the state charge. On August 22, 
1997, he was sentenced in state court to five years 
imprisonment. In sentencing the appellant, the state court 
credited him with the 134 days he had spent in state 
custody from April 11, 1997, to the date of sentencing. 
 
The appellant also pled guilty to the federal offense. On 
May 12, 1998, he was sentenced to 115 months. Invoking 
application note 2 to U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(b), the appellant 
sought credit for the entire time he had spent in state 
prison before his federal sentencing. This was a period of 
about 13 months, from April 11, 1997 (the date he was 
arrested on both the federal and state charges arising from 
the May 1996 firearms offense) to May 12, 1998, the date 
of his federal sentencing. However, the court refused the 
appellant's request, ruling that it had no authority to do so 
and that only the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) could give credit 
for the time he was incarcerated before imposition of 
sentence. As required by U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(b), the district 
court did order that the sentence run concurrently with the 
state sentence.1 And, as a concession to the appellant, the 
court noted on its judgment order that it had not decided 
the issue of sentence credit and was leaving it to the BOP. 
 
Dorsey then took this appeal. While the appeal was 
pending, the BOP gave the appellant credit for a part of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 5G1.3(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
        If . . . the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from 
       offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the 
       determination of the offense level for the instant offense, the 
       sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run 
       concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment. 
 
Here the undischarged term of imprisonment was the New Jersey 
sentence for the same firearms offense that was the subject of the federal 
offense. 
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13-month period. The BOP gave him credit for the following 
periods of prefederal-sentencing incarceration, totaling 
about four months and two weeks: (1) May 7, 1996, the 
date of his apprehension on the firearms offense (for which 
he began serving a state parole-violation term the next day), 
and (2) a period from April 11, 1997, the date he was 
arrested on the federal and state firearms charges, to 
August 21, 1997, the day before his state-court sentencing. 
However, it refused to give him credit for the approximately 
10-month period between his state sentencing, August 22, 
1997, and his federal sentencing, May 12, 1998. The 
parties agree that no credit was given for the latter period 
because 18 U.S.C. S 3585(b) prohibits the BOP from 
granting credit for time "that has been granted against 
another sentence," and this 10-month period was time 
serving his state sentence credited by New Jersey. See The 
Bureau of Prisons' Sentence Computation Manual at 1-17 
("credit will not be given for any portion of time spent 
serving another sentence [until a state facility is deemed 
federal which may only occur after the federal sentencing]"). 
 
II. 
 
Initially, we note that U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(b) itself is not at 
issue here. As indicated by its language, that guideline 
section only requires that the sentencing court run the 
federal sentence concurrently to the undischarged term of 
the other sentence. The district court complied with this 
guideline and made the federal sentence concurrent with 
the New Jersey sentence. 
 
The controversy arises from application note 2 to section 
5G1.3(b), the commentary to that guideline section, which 
provides further guidance for the sentencing court in 
imposing the concurrent sentence. On its face, application 
note 2 would require, at least partially, the result the 
appellant sought at sentencing. The application note, 
captioned "Adjusted concurrent sentence--subsection (b) 
cases," provides: 
 
       When a sentence is imposed pursuant to subsection 
       (b), the court should adjust the sentence for any period 
       of imprisonment already served as a result of the 
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       conduct taken into account in determining the 
       guideline range for the instant offense if the court 
       determines that period of imprisonment will not be 
       credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of 
       Prisons. 
 
The note then immediately follows with an example: 
 
       The defendant is convicted of a federal offense charging 
       the sale of 30 grams of cocaine. Under S 1B1.3 
       (Relevant Conduct), the defendant is held accountable 
       for the sale of an additional 15 grams of cocaine, an 
       offense for which the defendant has been convicted and 
       sentenced in state court. 
 
Continuing with the example, the note further assumes 
that the guideline range is 10 to 16 months and that the 
defendant was sentenced in state court to nine months on 
which he has already served six months. In these 
circumstances, the note advises the district court that, if it 
decides that a 13-month federal sentence is appropriate, it 
should shorten that sentence to seven months and, in this 
way, give credit on the federal sentence for the six months 
already served on the state sentence. The application note 
closes by advising the sentencing court that it should note 
on the sentencing order what it has done so that the 
adjustment is not confused with a departure from the 
guideline range but rather recognized as a "credit[ ]" under 
S 5G1.3(b) for time served "that will not be credited to the 
federal sentence under 18 U.S.C. S 3585(b)." (brackets 
added). 
 
In the instant case, if the district court had applied 
application note 2, while it could not have granted the full 
credit the appellant sought, it could have granted a 
sentence adjustment of some 10 months, representing a 
credit for the period between the date of the appellant's 
state sentencing, August 22, 1997, and the date of his 
federal sentencing, May 12, 1998. This represents a period 
of imprisonment that would not have been credited to the 
federal sentence by the BOP, as the BOP's later decision 
confirmed, because it represented time that the appellant 
was already serving on his state sentence. 
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Thus, we would have to reverse and remand for 
resentencing to allow for this credit unless the government 
is correct that application note 2 is invalid and that the 
district court correctly refused to follow it. Our review of the 
district court's legal interpretation of section 3585(b) and 
the guidelines is plenary. See United States v. Williamson, 
154 F.3d 504 (3d Cir. 1998). We turn now to the 
government's arguments. 
 
The government first contends that the district court was 
correct because under 18 U.S.C. S 3585(b), as construed by 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 
329, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992), only the 
Attorney General (by way of delegation to the BOP) has the 
authority to award credit for time served before federal 
sentencing. Section 3585(b) states as follows: 
 
       A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of 
       a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in 
       official detention prior to the date the sentence 
       commences-- 
 
        (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence 
       was imposed; or 
 
        (2) as a result of any other charge for which the 
       defendant was arrested after the commission of the 
       offense for which the sentence was imposed; 
 
       that has not been credited against another sentence. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3585(b). In Wilson, the Supreme Court held 
that, despite the ambiguity as to who was to award credit 
for time served, only the BOP has the authority under 
section 3585(b) to award such credit. However, the 
government reads too much into Wilson. 
 
The government argues that Wilson controls here because 
Wilson also dealt with federal and state sentences arising 
from the same criminal episode. However, it is not apparent 
from Wilson that Wilson did deal with such related offenses. 
The Supreme Court did not describe the offenses as being 
related. It merely stated that the defendant had been 
arrested on federal and state charges and had been held for 
a time in state custody on both sets of charges. 
Additionally, the lower court opinion indicates that they 
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were unrelated offenses. See United States v. Wilson, 916 
F.2d 1115, 1116 (6th Cir. 1990) (after noting the federal 
arrest for attempted bank robbery, noting that the 
defendant had been arrested by state authorities 
"apparently in connection with various other robberies") 
(emphasis added). Wilson does not apply here because it 
did not deal with the situation of a federal court exercising 
its discretion to impose a concurrent sentence and how to 
make that sentence truly concurrent to a sentence for a 
related offense, the subject of application note 2.2 
 
The government next argues that the district court acted 
properly because it did comply with U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b) by 
imposing a federal sentence concurrent with the state 
sentence. The government points out that guidelines 
section 5G1.3(b), as opposed to application note 2, only 
requires that the sentence for the instant offense"be 
imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of 
imprisonment"; it says nothing about adjusting the federal 
sentence to allow credit for prefederal sentencing detention. 
This argument is of no moment because the appellant is 
not relying on section 5G1.3(b) alone but on the 
commentary to that section in application note 2. We 
therefore turn to the government's arguments against the 
validity of application note 2. 
 
The government contends that application note 2 is 
invalid for three reasons. First, it conflicts with section 
3585(b) which, in the government's view, confers sole 
authority on the BOP to award custody credit. Second, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. For the same reason other cases the government cites are 
distinguishable. United States v. Brann, 990 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1993), dealt 
solely with whether the court rather than the BOP should award credit 
for presentencing home detention. In accord with Wilson, we held that 
the BOP was responsible. United States v. Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 
1997), and United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266 (7th Cir. 1995), dealt 
with unrelated state sentences. United States v. Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242 
(6th Cir. 1996), dealt with credit for a period of time the defendant was 
released on his own recognizance. United States v. Jenkins, 38 F.3d 
1143 (10th Cir. 1994), dealt with credit for a period of in-home 
detention. United States v. Moore, 978 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir. 1992), dealt 
with credit for time served in state custody on state charges that were 
subsequently dismissed. 
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provisions of application note 2 exceed the statutory 
authority of the Sentencing Commission. Third, upholding 
the note and allowing sentencing courts to grant credit 
along with the BOP will result in an unworkable scheme of 
shared authority. 
 
In its first argument, the government contends that the 
conflict between section 5G1.3(b) and section 3585(b) arises 
because application note 2 allows a sentencing court to 
grant credit when in light of section 3585(b) only the BOP 
has the authority to do so. The government acknowledges 
that generally a sentencing court must follow commentary 
to the Guidelines, see Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 
113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993), but asserts here 
that the commentary conflicts with section 3585(b) and is 
therefore invalid. Id. at 45, 113 S.Ct. at 1919, 123 L.Ed.2d 
at 608. See also United States v. Higgins, 128 F.3d 138, 
141 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[a] Guideline cannot trump a statute 
with which it conflicts.") (brackets added). 
 
We reject the government's position. In the instant case, 
the government would compare application note 2 solely to 
section 3585(b), but the situation is more complex than 
that. Under 18 U.S.C. S 3584(a), a district court has the 
authority to impose a concurrent sentence, but section 
3584(b) requires the court to consider the factors listed in 
18 U.S.C. S 3553(a). In turn, the latter section requires the 
court to consider "any applicable guidelines or policy 
statements issued by the sentencing Commission," as the 
Commission noted in its "Background" commentary to 
section 5G1.3. See 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(4)(A). Section 5G1.3 
was promulgated under the Sentencing Commission's 
authority, under 28 U.S.C. S 994(a)(1)(D), to issue 
guidelines for the use of sentencing courts in determining 
whether multiple sentences "should be ordered to run 
concurrently or consecutively." Application note 2 is 
commentary to subsection (b) of guidelines section 5G1.3. 
 
We are thus not confronted with a bare conflict between 
statutory section 3585(b) and guidelines section 5G1.3(b), 
but with a potential conflict between the BOP's authority 
under section 3585(b) to grant credit for presentencing 
detention and the sentencing court's authority to impose a 
concurrent sentence. And the real issue is whether the 
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sentencing court's authority must extend beyond the mere 
imposition of a concurrent sentence to the authority to 
impose a truly concurrent one, that is, a sentence that is 
not frustrated by the happenstance of when a defendant is 
sentenced in state and federal court. We believe a 
sentencing court has that authority under section 3584(a) 
and that application note 2 facilitates the court's authority. 
Moreover, as written, there is no conflict between the note 
and section 3585(b) because a district court can only award 
credit when the BOP will not do so. 
 
To begin with, the Supreme Court has noted that the 
overall purpose of section 5G1.3 is "to mitigate the 
possibility that the fortuity of two separate prosecutions will 
grossly increase a defendant's sentence." Witte v. United 
States, 515 U.S. 389, 405, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2209-10, 
132 L.Ed.2d 351, 367 (1995). In Witte, the Court also 
stated: 
 
       There are often valid reasons why related crimes 
       committed by the same defendant are not prosecuted 
       in the same proceeding, and S 5G1.3 of the Guidelines 
       attempts to achieve some coordination of sentences 
       imposed in such situations with an eye toward having 
       such punishments approximate the total penalty that 
       would have been imposed had the sentences for the 
       different offenses been imposed at the same time (i.e., 
       had all of the offenses been prosecuted in a single 
       proceeding). See USSG S 5G1.3, comment., n. 3. 
 
Id. at 404-05, 115 S.Ct. at 2208, 132 L.Ed.2d at 367. In 
Witte the Court was discussing the 1992 version of the 
commentary, not the 1995 version that we are dealing with. 
However, the 1995 version does not differ materially from 
the current application note. The major difference is that 
application note 2 now explicitly recognizes that the court 
cannot grant credit when the BOP will do so. 
 
Our position is supported by other courts that have 
considered the issue. In United States v. Kiefer, 20 F.3d 874 
(8th Cir. 1994), the Eighth Circuit held that a sentencing 
court had authority under section 5G1.3(b) to grant a 
defendant credit on his federal sentence for all the time he 
served, before the federal sentencing, in Minnesota state 
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custody on a related state charge. Under 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(e)(1), the defendant was subject to a mandatory 
minimum federal sentence of 15 years (180 months). Under 
his plea agreement, he could not be sentenced to more than 
188 months. He had spent 14-and-one-half months in state 
custody. The district court applied section 5G1.3(b) but 
believed that it could not reduce the sentence below the 
mandatory minimum. Hence, instead of a sentence of 173- 
and-one-half-months, it imposed a sentence of 180 months. 
 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit first rejected the 
government's argument that the defendant was seeking a 
sentence credit and hence under Wilson had to seek relief 
from the BOP. The court stated: 
 
       [I]n this appeal Kiefer seeks to invoke a Guidelines 
       provision to reduce his federal sentence. That is a 
       question for the sentencing court, and we find nothing 
       in Wilson suggesting that the Attorney General's 
       authority under S 3585(b) limits a sentencing court's 
       power to apply S 5G1.3 of the Guidelines. Therefore, we 
       agree with the district court that it had jurisdiction to 
       consider this S 5G1.3 issue. 
 
Id. at 875-76 (brackets added). The court also noted that: 
"In general, S 5G1.3 is intended to result in a federal 
sentence `that most nearly approximates the sentence that 
would have been imposed had all the sentences been 
imposed at the same time.' S 5G1.3, comment. (backg'd)." 
Then, turning to the precise issue presented, whether a 
mandatory minimum sentence prevents full application of 
section 5G1.3(b), the court stated: 
 
       Section 924(e)(1) was enacted after the Sentencing 
       Reform Act. The Reform Act provides that the district 
       courts must determine whether sentences should be 
       concurrent or consecutive. See 18 U.S.C.S 3584(b). In 
       doing so, the court "shall consider," among other 
       factors, "the kinds of sentence ... set forth in the 
       guidelines." 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a). Section 5G1.3 is part 
       of that sentencing regime. Since in this example Kiefer 
       was "imprisoned" by Minnesota for the identical 
       firearms offense, we conclude that there would be no 
       violation of the plain language of S 924(e)(1), and that 
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       these various sentencing statutes would be properly 
       harmonized, if S 924(e)(1) were construed to permit the 
       sentencing court to give Kiefer a sentence credit in the 
       form of a reduced federal sentence under S 5G1.3(b). 
 
Id. at 876. The court remanded so that the sentencing 
court could exercise its discretion to award a full credit for 
the time spent in state custody. Kiefer was followed in 
United States v. Drake, 49 F.3d 1438 (9th Cir. 1995), a case 
also dealing with a mandatory minimum sentence under 
section 924(e)(1). 
 
We adopt Kiefer's reasoning. Guidelines section 5G1.3(b) 
and application note 2 harmonize the court's discretion 
under section 3584 to make a federal sentence concurrent 
with other terms of imprisonment and the BOP's authority 
under section 3585(b) to award credit for presentence 
custody. There is no conflict between the two because 
application note 2 restricts the credit the sentencing court 
can award to time that will not be awarded by the BOP. 
And the court must be able to award this credit to make 
the sentences truly concurrent. Otherwise, the concurrent 
sentencing principles of section 3584 would be frustrated. 
See Kiefer, 20 F.3d at 876. 
 
The government criticizes Kiefer and Drake as dealing 
with the issue in dicta and in a conclusory fashion. 
However, Kiefer's ruling on this issue was a necessary part 
of its decision to reverse the district court and it made plain 
why it ruled as it did, to harmonize the sentencing court's 
authority with that of the BOP. 
 
In regard to the government's second argument, based on 
the foregoing, it follows that the promulgation of application 
note 2 did not exceed the Commission's authority since it 
effectuates the sentencing court's discretion to impose a 
concurrent sentence. As noted above, under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3584(a) the sentencing court has the discretion to impose 
a concurrent sentence. In doing so, it must consider the 
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a). Among these factors 
are guidelines and commentary from the Sentencing 
Commission. Under 28 U.S.C. S 994(a)(1)(D), the 
Commission has the authority to promulgate guidelines for 
the determination of whether a sentence shall run 
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concurrently or consecutively. A sentence cannot be 
concurrent if the random chance of when multiple 
sentences are imposed results in a defendant serving, 
contrary to the intent of the sentencing court, additional 
and separate time on one sentence that was meant to be 
served at the same time as another sentence. 
 
As the Supreme Court also indicated, the government's 
position also introduces a certain fortuity into the 
sentencing process because under the BOP's interpretation 
of section 3585(b), credit for time served before imposition 
of the federal sentence will depend on when the state 
sentence was imposed. For example, in the instant case, if 
New Jersey had sentenced the appellant on September 22, 
1997, or October 22, 1997, rather than on August 22, 
1997, appellant would have received credit on his federal 
sentence for the additional one- or two-month period 
because this was time that he was not yet serving on his 
state sentence and hence allowable as a credit against the 
federal sentence. Yet, because he was actually sentenced on 
August 22, 1997, he received a smaller credit. Actual time 
of imprisonment should not turn on the happenstance of 
the scheduling of sentencing dates.3 
 
The government's final argument is that a scheme of 
shared authority over sentence credits by the sentencing 
court and the BOP is unworkable. The government points 
out that section 5G1.3(b), in allowing the sentencing court 
to grant a credit for time that will not be credited by the 
BOP, requires the sentencing court to predict what credit 
will be awarded by the BOP. The government argues that 
this will not always be readily apparent to a sentencing 
court but that the BOP can be accurate in its award of 
credit because of its administrative expertise and because 
it has the assistance of its Sentencing Computation 
Manual. 
 
As an example, the government argues that in the instant 
case, despite the language on the face of section 3585(b) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We also reject the government's contention that, because the example 
used concerns relevant conduct, the note applies only to credit for 
relevant conduct. The example is just an example. The note broadly 
refers to credit for time that will not be credited by the BOP. 
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prohibiting credit for time served on another sentence, the 
BOP did award the appellant credit for about four months 
and two weeks, essentially the period between the date of 
his arrest on the charges and the date of his New Jersey 
sentencing, even though the appellant received credit for 
this time on his New Jersey sentence. These are so-called 
Willis credits, named after Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 
923 (5th Cir. 1971). The government also points out that 
the BOP refused to award credit for the additional 10- 
month period because the BOP manual forbids it. 
 
The government stresses that a district court, in relying 
only on section 3585(b) could easily make the wrong 
prediction as to what credit will be awarded. Further, 
"[e]ven if the district courts had the time or resources to 
decipher the Bureau of Prison's voluminous and highly 
technical Sentencing Computations Manual," (government's 
brief at p. 28), the government argues that the court's lack 
of expertise will sometimes lead to a mistake, a mistake 
that would be compounded because neither the government 
nor the defendant would have any recourse under 
application note 2 from such an error. 
 
We reject this argument. Although the government 
contends that the computation of sentencing credits is 
fraught with difficulty, the only example it raises is the 
instant case, which presents a straightforward calculation. 
Under section 5G1.3(b), the district court does not award a 
Willis credit (because this is time that will be awarded by 
the BOP) but does award credit for the remainder of the 
prefederal sentencing time (because the BOP cannot award 
this under section 3585(b)). We note that the courts in 
Kiefer and Drake did not see any difficulty in applying 
section 5G1.3(b) nor did the courts in United States v. Bell, 
28 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 1994), or United States v. Hicks, 4 
F.3d 1358 (6th Cir. 1993), cases in which the courts also 
applied section 5G1.3(b). 
 
Contrary to the government's position, any error in the 
section 5G1.3(b) sentence adjustment can be corrected on 
direct appeal. Under 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a)(2), the defendant 
can appeal an incorrect application of the sentencing 
guidelines and under section 3742(b)(2), the government 
may do the same. 
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III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the district 
court's sentencing order and remand with direction that the 
court follow the dictates of application note 2 to U.S.S.G. 
S 5G1.3(b) in resentencing the appellant. 
 
                                14 
  
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 
I join the opinion of the Court. I write separately to note 
that much of the conflict which the government perceives 
between S 3585(b) and Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. 
S 5G1.3(b) is attributable to its use of the word "credit" to 
refer to two distinct benefits that a convicted defendant 
may receive. A sentencing judge is charged with 
determining the length of any sentence of incarceration to 
be served. In the course of doing so, it may impose a lesser 
sentence than it otherwise would because of any number of 
relevant factors in the case. After a defendant has been 
sentenced to a term of incarceration, the custodian must 
determine when the sentence imposed will have been 
satisfied. In the course of doing so, the custodian may give 
"credit" against the sentence for such things as presentence 
detention, good behavior, etc. 
 
In Chapter 35 of Title 18, "giving credit" is used as a term 
of art referred only to the latter form of benefit. We agree 
with the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal that the 
Supreme Court in Wilson was referring only to the latter 
form of benefit when it held that only the Bureau of Prisons 
is authorized by S 3585(b) to "give credit" against a 
previously imposed sentence. While it is true, as the 
government stresses, that the effect upon the defendant 
may be the same whether he receives a sentence shortened 
to reflect presentence detention or a sentence not so 
shortened followed by credit for such detention, we cannot 
ignore the fact that "giving credit" is used as a term of art 
in S 3585(b) and is not mentioned at all in S 5G1.3(b). 
 
As the opinion of the Court explains, Congress' 
sentencing scheme assigns to the sentencing judge the task 
of determining whether the sentence to be imposed shall 
run consecutively or concurrently with a previously 
imposed sentence. In the specific situation where the 
conduct for which a defendant is being sentenced has 
resulted in a previously imposed sentence, S 5G1.3(b), 
utilizing the authority granted by S 3584(b), makes a policy 
choice that the total time served for the conduct not vary 
depending on the fortuity of when the two sentences are 
imposed. It accomplishes this by providing (a) that the new 
sentence will run concurrently with the undischarged term 
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of the prior sentence, and (b) that the new sentence will be 
reduced by an amount equal to the time previously served 
on the prior sentence if the Court determines that the 
Bureau of Prisons will not give credit for such time under 
S 3585(b).1 We do not find this policy choice unauthorized 
by the Sentencing Reform Act or inconsistent with 
Congress' intent that, once a sentence is imposed, the 
Attorney General or its designee have sole authority to 
determine when that sentence will be discharged. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Contrary to the government's suggestion, our decision today will not 
require that district courts master the BOP manual on sentencing credits 
and predict how it will be applied in a multitude of new situations. 
Section 3585(b) applies generally to credit for all kinds of pretrial 
detention and specifically forecloses the BOP from awarding credit for 
time that has been "credited against another sentence." U.S.S.G. 
S 5G1.3(b) applies to a limited universe of cases in which the prior 
detention is attributable to service of a prior sentence that should run 
concurrently with the one being imposed. In at least the vast majority of 
S 5G1.3(b) cases, the BOP will be foreclosed from granting a relevant 
credit because the time previously served will have been credited towards 
another sentence. 
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